With CPT-invariant initial conditions that commute with CPT-invariant final conditions, the respective probabilities (when defined) of a set of histories and its CPT reverse are equal, giving a CPT-symmetric universe. This leads me to question whether the asymmetry of the Gell-Mann-Hartle decoherence functional for ordinary quantum mechanics should be interpreted as an asymmetry of time .
where ρ i is an initial density matrix, ρ f is a final density matrix, and
is a string of projection operators representing the history α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ) in the Heisenberg picture, with t 1 < t 2 < · · · < t n . Alternatively, C α could be a sum of such strings. When {α} is an exhaustive set of histories, meaning
and when this set decoheres, meaning
then the diagonal elements of the decoherence functional give the probabilities for all histories of that set:
Ordinary quantum mechanics corresponds to the special case of this in which ρ i is proportional to the density matrix of the system and ρ f is proportional to the identity matrix I, giving a final condition of indifference. In this case the difference between ρ i and ρ f leads to an asymmetric decoherence functional D(α, α ′ ) and set of diagonal elements p(α), which Gell-Mann and Hartle interpret as the (ordinary) quantum-mechanical arrow of time.
To be specific, suppose the initial and final density matrices are separately CPTinvariant but not the CPT reverses of each other (so each separate state is time symmetric, by which I shall henceforth mean CPT-invariant rather than T-invariant in order for the dynamical laws to be time symmetric):
where Θ is the antiunitary CPT operator. Follow Gell-Mann and Hartle [8] in defining the CPT-reversed historyα represented by the string
and with the order of the projection operators reversed to put the earlier times on the right and the later ones on the left, −t n < · · · < −t 2 < −t 1 . This gives
which is generally true even when C α is a sum of strings (2) . Then Eq. (6) implies
which would be the complex conjugate of
obey the sum rules necessary for them to be interpreted as probabilities, then the separate CPT invariance of each density matrix implies that the respective probabilities of the corresponding sets of CPT-related histories agree, as the following theorem shows:
Theorem 1: If the initial density matrix ρ i and the final density matrix ρ f commute, if they obey Eq. (6) and hence are each separately CPT-invariant, and if the set of histories {α} and the corresponding CPT-reversed set {α} obey Eqs. (4) and (12) and hence decohere, then the corresponding probabilities of the respective individual histories, p(α) and p(α) as given by Eqs. (5) and (13), are equal.
Proof: Summing the decoherence condition (4) over all α ′ different from α and using the completeness relation (3) allows one to rewrite Eq. (5) as
where the cyclic property of the trace is used here and below to get the C α at the right end. Similarly, summing Eq. (12) over allα different fromα ′ , using (11) and the analogue of (3), and then dropping the prime, converts Eq. (13) into
Now Eq. (10), the cyclic property, Eq. (6), and the assumption that ρ i and ρ f commute give
Therefore,
so the probabilities of CPT-related histories are equal under the assumptions above, even without assuming that the initial and final density matrices are the CPT re-
As an example of a consequence of this theorem, consider the case in which C α is a single string (2) with P 1 α 1 (t 1 ) corresponding to low coarse-grained entropy and P n αn (t n ) corresponding to high entropy, so that the history α has entropy increasing from the earliest time t 1 to the latest time t n . Assuming that the definition of coarse-grained entropy is CPT invariant, so thatP k α k (−t k ) corresponds to the same entropy as P k α k (t k ), then the CPT-reversed historyα has entropy decreasing from the new earliest time −t n (that of the projection operator now adjacent to ρ i ) to the new latest time −t 1 (that of the projection operator now adjacent to ρ f ). Then under the conditions above (commuting CPT-invariant ρ i and ρ f ), the probability of a history α with one thermodynamic time asymmetry is equal to that of the historỹ α with the opposite thermodynamic time asymmetry, so long as both probabilities exist. In other words, the asymmetry of the decoherence functional does not give any preferred direction (in the sense of differing probabilities) for the thermodynamic arrow of time, even if one sticks with the convention [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] that the earliest times correspond to the operators nearest to ρ i in the decoherence functional.
As an aside, we may note that if ρ i and ρ f commute so that we may construct new Hermitian positive-semidefinite initial and final density matrices
and if the set of histories {α} decoheres for the new decoherence functional
then a similar proof shows that
However, for generic commuting ρ i and ρ f , the new decoherence condition is independent of the old one and/or its CPT-reverse, so the theory need not be the same for ρ ′ i and ρ ′ f as for ρ i and ρ f if one chooses sets of histories which decohere for one set of density matrices and not for the other.
If we do have a final condition of indifference, ρ f ∝ I, which corresponds to ordinary quantum mechanics, it obviously commutes with any ρ i and is CPT invariant. Therefore, in ordinary quantum mechanics the CPT invariance of the initial density matrix is sufficient to imply that the probabilities of a set of histories equal the corresponding probabilities of the CPT-reversed set (if both sets decohere, as is necessary to get probabilities obeying the sum rules). Such a universe would be CPT-invariant, according to the definition of Gell-Mann and Hartle [8] , even without their alternative sufficient condition Of course, the time symmetry of the probabilities of CPT-reversed sets of decohering histories does not imply that each history with a significant probability within one of those sets is itself time symmetric, as was illustrated by the example above with changing entropy. It merely implies that the time-reversed history in the other set has the same probability. Thus observers in one of the histories may see that history as being time asymmetric, even if the overall initial and final quantum states are each separately time symmetric and so lead to equal corresponding probabilities for the two CPT-reversed sets of decohering histories. This would also be true under the alternative time-symmetric condition (22) of Gell-Mann and Hartle [8] , as they indeed carefully point out.
Thus our observations of an apparently time-asymmetric history for our universe [12, 13] do not yet appear to rule out either time-symmetric possibility (6) or (22), as is consistent with what Gell-Mann and Hartle [8] noted. Possibility (6) is exemplified by the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal for the quantum state of the universe [14, 15, 16, 17, 18] . Emulating John A. Wheeler [19] , one may say that our history of the universe has "time asymmetry final conditions) are not testable within any one individual history of the universe (e.g., ours) and therefore are both rather metaphysical. Nevertheless, one can say very little if one attempts to be a complete positivist, and therefore I shall continue to consider how a nonphysical meta-observer might view the entire universe.
It seems to me that the asymmetry of the Gell-Mann-Hartle decoherence functional has more to do with the order and noncommutation of the density and/or projection operators than with any time asymmetry. It would exist even when all of these operators are completely stationary as well as CPT invariant, in which case it seems very unnatural to ascribe it to anything involving time.
The asymmetry seems to get associated with time because of the traditional rule of ordering the projection operators in Eq. (2) in time order, which Gell-Mann and Hartle have adopted in their formalism. They do note [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] that one would get an equivalent result by a CPT tranformation of the density and projection operators which gives them an anti-time ordering, but they do not allow zigzags, in which the times in the successive operators are not monotonically decreasing or increasing.
Gell-Mann and Hartle say zigzags can lead to "non-zero probabilities [for] conflicting alternatives at the same time" [10] . Here "conflicting" cannot be taken to mean "orthogonal," because then the probability sum rules would imply that the probabilities for conflicting alternatives would be zero, no matter what the times.
The statement is true if "conflicting" is taken to mean "noncommuting" [20] , but then it is not clear to me why noncommuting projection operators should be considered as not conflicting even if they occur at different times in some history.
One might have thought that the probabilities for sequences of alternatives would depend on the order in which the operators are written down to form the string C α .
This may indeed be true for nonadjacent operators (or strings of them). However, it turns out that the order of two adjacent substrings within a string does not affect the probabilities (so long as they exist for both orderings), as is shown by the following theorem (a generalization of the penultimate sentence of Section III of Hartle [21] ):
Theorem 2: Consider a set of histories {α} = {(α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , α 4 )} represented by
(where each substring α i is independently allowed to take on all possible values) and a corresponding zigzag set {α} = {(α 1 ,α 2 ,α 3 ,α 4 )} represented bŷ
Cα =ĉ
Similarly, the corresponding weak decoherence condition Re D(α,α ′ ) = 0 forα =α To interchange two nonadjacent substrings or sums of strings and get the same probabilities, we would need three permutations to get them through the intermediate substring and through each other. Without assuming that the two intermediate permutations also give decohering sets of histories, the decoherence of merely the initial and final sets is in many cases sufficient for proving the equality of their corresponding probabilities, but not always [20] . Thus a difference in the probabilities appears to be possible. Therefore, except possibly for the caveat of the last paragraph, the motivation to exclude zigzags and keep the projection operators in time (or anti-time) order is lost on me. Thus I am not convinced that the asymmetry that arises from the order of the projection operators relative to that of the density matrices should be associated with the order of time. In other words, I do not see that ordinary quantum mechanics with CPT-invariant initial conditions gives any time asymmetry, at least for the probabilities of an CPT-reversed pair of decohering sets of histories, although in a different sense one could say it is indeed quantum mechanics that allows nonunique histories, each of which can be time asymmetric even when the whole set of CPT-reversed pairs is not.
